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Abstract
We develop and test experimentally a theoretical model of the role of self-esteem,
generated by private feedback regarding relative performance, on the behavior of
agents working on an effort provision task for a flat wage. Agents work harder and
expect to rank better when they are told they may learn their ranking, relative
to cases when they are told feedback will not be provided. Individuals who learn
that they have ranked better than expected decrease their output but expect an
even better rank in the future, while those who were told they ranked worse than
expected increase their output and at the same time lower their rank expectations
going forward. These effects are stronger in earlier rounds of the task, while subjects
learn how they compare to their peers. This rank hierarchy is established early
on, and remains relatively stable afterwards. Private relative rank information
helps create a ratcheting effect in the group’s average output, which is mainly due
to the fight for dominance at the top of the hierarchy. Hence, in environments
where monetary incentives are weak, moral hazard may be mitigated by providing
feedback to agents regarding their relative performance, and by optimally choosing
the reference peer group.
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1 Introduction
Self-esteem has long been thought of in the psychology literature as a strong motivator
of human behavior (Maslow (1943), McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell (1953)).
Recently, this concept has been introduced in theoretical models of economic choice
(Benabou and Tirole (2002), Koszegi (2006)) as “ego utility”. People derive utility from
thinking of themselves as good, skilled or valuable according to some social criteria, and
their actions are shaped by the desire to maintain high levels of self-esteem.
So far, the economics literature on ego utility has focused on understanding the role of
self-esteem on behavior in non-competitive settings. However, ego utility may also affect
strategic interactions, where self-esteem is determined by an individual’s beliefs about
his relative standing among his peers, and not necessarily by beliefs about absolute
measures of his ability. In such settings, beliefs about relative rank are modified by the
feedback that individuals receive about their relative performance. Therefore, ego utility
is influenced not only by an individual’s own actions, but also by those of other players.
While these strategic considerations are similar to those studied in the tournaments
literature1, existing theory models do not capture the behavior of agents in settings
where the benefit of being the most productive player is simply ego utility, or self-esteem.
Moreover, there are no empirical or experimental accounts of behavior in such settings.
We seek to address these two gaps in the literature.
Specifically, our goal is to understand the role of ego utility on productivity in com-
petitive settings where participants receive private feedback about their relative stand-
ing. We isolate the ego utility effect from other reasons why feedback about rank may
change behavior. For instance, feedback may influence productivity if compensation
is performance-based, since people seem to care more about their relative, rather then
objective level of wealth (Clark and Oswald (1996), Easterlin (1995), Luttmer (2005)).
Feedback may also change behavior if it provides information about the nature of the
project (Seta (1982), Bandura (1986), Kluger and DeNisi (1996)). Moreover, if feedback
is public, and thus the relative ranking is common knowledge among participants, peer
monitoring or concerns for social status and reputation may influence the participants’
behavior going forward (Kandel and Lazear (1992), Knez and Simester (2001), Falk and
Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2007)). To minimize the influence of these other channels
through which relative rank information may impact actions, we employ a setting where
1See Prendergast (1999) for a review.
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participants receive a flat wage, the task that they work on does not involve changes in
strategy or learning, and feedback is private and anonymous.
The theoretical model we develop and our experimental results imply that private
feedback about relative ranking has both ex-ante and ex-post effects on the productivity
of workers and on the dynamics of social hierarchies. Agents work harder and expect to
rank better when they are told they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when they
are told feedback will not be provided. After receiving feedback, individuals who learn
that they have ranked better than expected decrease their output but expect an even
better rank in the future, while those who were told they ranked worse than expected
increase their output and at the same time lower their rank expectations going forward.
These effects are stronger in earlier rounds of the task, while subjects learn how they
compare to their peers in terms of output produced. This rank hierarchy is established
early on, and it remains relatively stable later in the task. Private information regarding
relative standing helps create a ratcheting effect in the group’s average output. This
ratcheting effect (working harder over time) is mainly due to the fight for dominance at
the top of the hierarchy. Moreover, increasing the heterogeneity in the ability of members
of the peer group leads to lower output from low ability individuals, but has no impact
on the output of high ability workers.
Our premise that people’s self-esteem depends on their relative standing among peers
is supported by a large body of evidence. Research from social psychology shows that
when effort is unobservable people work harder when they are provided with a social
comparison criterion, for example with the average productivity of past participants
(Szymanski and Harkins (1987), White, Kjelgaard, and Harkins (1995)). Thus, individ-
uals are willing to exert more costly effort to avoid falling behind the average, and to
be better than the average. In the context of a search experiment, Falk, Huffman, and
Sunde (2006) show that low productivity subjects are more likely than high productivity
ones to choose not to learn their rank in the group at the end of the task, consistent with
the idea that a low rank decreases utility.
This paper contributes to the theoretical and experimental literature on ego utility,
intrinsic motivation and peer effects. On the theory side, Benabou and Tirole (2002) focus
on the effect of self-esteem on the behavior of people with time inconsistent preferences.
They argue that self-confidence is valuable because it enhances motivation to act, and
investigate a variety of intrapersonal strategies people may use to enhance their self-
image. They show that people may handicap their performance (for example by exerting
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low effort), and use self-deception through selective memory or awareness management
in order to maintain high self-perception about their ability. This keeps them motivated
to undertake profitable endeavors in the future. Weinberg (1999) and Koszegi (2006), on
the other hand, treat self-esteem as a consumption good and incorporate it directly in the
utility function. They assume that individuals’ utility is increasing with their perception
of their own ability, which is updated in a Bayesian manner after receiving new relevant
information.
These models, however, do not take into account the fact that in most real life situa-
tions people exert externalities on one another. Usually, one’s self-esteem is not shaped
in isolation but is also influenced by the actions of others. Thus, the predictions of extant
theoretical models regarding people’s reaction to relative rank information in the absence
of monetary incentives are not clear. When feedback is provided, ex-ante concerns for
self-image can increase effort, as agents seek to learn that they rank high. However, the
prospect of receiving feedback can also lead to lower ex-ante effort, because of disap-
pointment avoidance. As suggested by Koszegi (2006), agents with positive beliefs about
themselves wish to preserve their self-esteem and may decide to avoid competing, because
doing so reduces the informativeness of signals about ability obtained during the task.
Ex-post effects of feedback are also difficult to predict based on existent theories. For
instance, after receiving bad feedback about relative performance, people with self-image
concerns could employ deception strategies as suggested in Benabou and Tirole (2002)
in order to discard this information or interpret it to their advantage. They may give up
competing if the perceived chances of winning in the future are minimal, or may engage
in the task again because it is the only way to regain self-confidence (Koszegi (2006)).
Extending these prior models, our theoretical framework applies to multi-agent settings
and makes clear predictions about which of these effects should be observed in the data.
Related to the work on self-esteem is a large literature on the value of public recogni-
tion, or status. People care about social status as defined by their relative income (Frank
(1984), Frank (1985)), they value public recognition independently of any monetary con-
sequence and are willing to trade off material gains to obtain it (Huberman, Loch, and
Onculer (2004)). The quest for status has labor market implications, for instance regard-
ing wage and promotion schemes, or job search and sorting (Cowen and Glazer (2007)).
Using survey and experimental data, Clark, Masclet, and Villeval (2006) find that status
measured as one’s rank in the income distribution has a more powerful effect on work
effort than does the others’ average income, suggesting that social comparisons are more
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ordinal than cardinal.
Peer monitoring has also been proposed as an effective incentive mechanism (Major,
Testa, and Bylsma (1991), Kandel and Lazear (1992)). Performing well in front of peers
seems to matter even when output does not have an impact on monetary payoffs (Knez
and Simester (2001), Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and Moretti (2007)). The increase
in output observed when people work along peers seems to come mainly from low-output
individuals, who work harder in the presence of higher productivity workers (Seta (1982),
Bandura (1986), Mas and Moretti (2007))
In contrast to these two streams of work on status seeking and peer monitoring effects,
our focus is on the internal drive of individuals to rank well relative to others, and not
on people’s need for public recognition or reputation among peers. In line with prior
evidence, we assume that people enjoy performing well relative to others even in situations
when performance is private information, or when there are no future consequences via
reputation or career concerns channels. A related driver of behavior to the one studied
here is intrinsic motivation: people enjoy effortful endeavors, even in the absence of
incentive pay, because completing such endeavors generates a sense of personal growth
and fulfillment (e.g. Deci (1975)). Benabou and Tirole (2003) formalize the concepts
of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and show under which conditions the latter will
“crowd out” or “crowd in” the former.2 There is extensive evidence in the literature that
external intervention (for example output-based pay or monitoring) crowds out intrinsic
motivation and undermines productivity (see Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) or Frey
and Jegen (2001) for reviews). For instance, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that
piece rates lead to increased performance only if they are substantial and even piece
rates as high as 10% may lead to a decrease in output as compared to a situation where
no incentive pay is used. Since extrinsic motivators often turn out to have detrimental
effects, finding the optimal level of incentive pay that would improve rather than impair
productivity is not trivial. We are therefore considering an alternative incentive device
- private information about one’s relative position in the group - that can potentially
reinforce intrinsic motivation in ego-driven individuals.
It is possible, though, that in environments where monetary incentives are strong
enough to actually motivate people to work hard, they may crowd out the effect of feed-
2A reduced-form approach to this topic is presented by Frey (1997). The interplay between the
two types of incentives is generated by the assumption that extrinsic motivators (e.g. bonuses) convey
information about the agent’s ability or about the difficulty of the task, and hence influence the agent’s
intrinsic interest in making the project successful.
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back that we demonstrate here in a flat-wage environment. In a related paper, Eriksson,
Poulsen, and Villeval (2008) measure output and effort levels across subject groups that
face one of two variable compensation schemes — piece-rate or tournament pay— and
find that releasing information about relative performance does not significantly influence
the subjects’ average output or effort in either pay condition.
Our results, however, suggest that in settings where monetary incentives are weak or
non-existent, moral hazard can be mitigated by optimally providing feedback to agents
regarding their relative performance. Ego utility, or self-esteem can be used as a motiva-
tor for productivity. In light of these findings, it is possible that by changing the reference
peer group, a social planner or principal can benefit from the dynamics of social hierar-
chy effects on productivity. Rankings are commonly used in many environments – for
example, in the labor market for corporate executives or fund managers, in educational
institutions or sales departments. Institutions that publish rankings are usually con-
cerned with the performance of their members. Therefore, understanding what impact
rankings may have on performance is of key importance to the motivational politics of a
modern firm.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
In our model two agents, i and j, work on similar tasks. Each individual output is
observable and verifiable. The individual output depends on the worker’s skill and on
the amount of effort he has put into the task. We assume the following production
function
yi = ai + ei + ε˜i (1)
where ai represents the agent’s innate ability level, ei is the amount of effort that the
agent has put into his task and the term ε˜i is the realization of an exogenous transitory
shock (ε˜i ∼ N(0, σ
2)) independently and identically distributed across agents. The agent
does not know his own ability, nor the ability of his opponent.
We assume that each agent’s utility is increasing in his own output, since people
enjoy knowing that they are productive (Deci (1975)). Moreover, we assume that the
agent’s utility depends also on how his output compares to that of the other agent, with
utility decreasing in the output of the opponent. This assumption captures the empirical
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regularity that people enjoy performing better relative to others (e.g., Szymanski and
Harkins (1987)). Importantly, agents work for a fixed wage, and do not receive pay linked
to performance. The agent is also free to choose how much to care, or pay attention to
the feedback about the opponent’s output, and therefore about his own relative rank in
this task. The intensity with which the agent chooses to care about the other person’s
output is captured by parameter si ≥ 0. This assumption is similar to that of Benabou
and Tirole (2002) that people may ignore information about output in order to preserve
their self-esteem.
We assume that the agent’s utility after he observes only his own output is equal to
the level of his output yi. If he also observes the output of his opponent his utility is
equal to yi−yj ln
(
k
k−si
)
, where k > si is a parameter. Expression ln
(
k
k−si
)
is increasing
in si. This means that, all else equal, the higher si the agent sets, the more he needs to
produce to achieve a given level of utility from comparing his output to that of the other
agent.
At the end of the working period each agent always knows how much he produced and
he may also learn how much the other agent produced. In the beginning of the working
period each agent knows the probability (denoted by p for agent i and q for agent j) with
which he will get information about the output of his opponent. Working on the task is
costly. Agent i, who will receive information about the output of the other agent with
probability p, experiences the following disutility (cost of effort) while working:
ci(ai, ei) = (β − γai) ln (ei − psi) (2)
where β > 0 and 0 < γ < 1 are parameters. For the cost function to be well-defined, we
assume that β − γai > 0 and ei − psi > 1
3.
Since γ > 0, we assume that effort is less costly for a more able worker. That is, being
better skilled to do a task makes the job more enjoyable, while being less able makes
working on the task more frustrating, stressful or disappointing.
Moreover, we assume that effort is less costly if agents set a higher standard for
themselves (in other words, being more motivated makes the task less unpleasant), and
also, if the probability of learning their rank is higher. This last assumption is technical
and it assures that when p = 0, the standard set si by the agent does not change
the cost function, since in that situation the agent will not actually learn their relative
3Always holds in equilibrium.
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performance (so the agent will not be able to compare himself with his competitor).
Therefore, ex-ante an agent who does not know his own or his opponent’s ability and
expects to get feedback about the opponent with probability p has the following expected
utility function:
Ei (ui) = (1− p)Ei (yi) + p
(
Ei (yi)− Ei (yj) ln
(
k
k − si
))
− (β − γEi (ai)) ln (ei − psi)
(3)
which is equivalent to
Ei (ui) = Ei (ai) + ei − pEi (yj) (ln k − ln (k − si))− (β − γEi (ai)) ln (ei − psi) (4)
The endogenous reference standard si has two effects. As in Falk and Knell (2004), the
benefits of getting feedback about relative performance, as well as the cost of producing
output decrease with si. The latter assumption captures the positive motivational effect
of goal setting. The same level of effort appears to be less costly when one works on
ambitious and demanding tasks. The former assumption illustrates that the chosen
standard si can be interpreted as a measure of how much the individual would be hurt
by an increase in the output of the other player, or of how frequently he decides to
compare himself to the other. The higher si is, the more ambitious is the goal set by
agent i.
Agent i, therefore, faces the following problem:
max
ei,si
Ei (ai) + ei − pEi (yj) (ln k − ln (k − si))− (β − γEi (ai)) ln (ei − psi) (5)
which gives the following first order conditions:
ei = β − γEi (ai) + psi (6)
si =
k (γEi (ai)− β) + eiEi (yj)
γEi (ai)− β + pEi (yj)
(7)
From equations (6) and (7) we get that:
e∗i = β − γEi (ai) + p
(
k − Ei
(
y∗j
))
(8)
s∗i = k − Ei
(
y∗j
)
(9)
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For simplicity, to avoid infinite hierarchies of beliefs, we restrict attention to the first
order beliefs, that is, to beliefs about one’s own ability (Ei (ai) and Ej (aj)) and beliefs
about ability of the other player (Ei (aj) and Ej (ai)). Second order beliefs – that is,
beliefs of player i about the beliefs of player j – are such that Ei (Ej (aj)) = Ei (aj) and
Ei (Ej (ai)) = Ei (ai).
Also, Ei (Ej (p)) = Ej (p) = Ej (Ei (q)) = Ei (q) =
1
2
. Given these assumptions we
get that agent i expects agent j to produce:
Ei
(
y∗j
)
= Ei (aj + β − γEj (aj) + q (k − Ejai −Ej (e
∗
i )))
= Ei(aj) + β − γEi (aj) +
k
2
−
1
2
Eiai −
1
2
Ei (Ej (e
∗
i )) (10)
Let e∗i ≡ Ei (Ej (e
∗
i )) =
∫ 1
0
e∗i (p)f(p)dp. Then combining equations (10) and (8) we
get that:
e∗i = β − γEi (ai) + p
(
k −
(
Ei (aj) + β − γEi (aj) +
k
2
−
1
2
Ei (ai)−
1
2
e∗i
))
After rearranging we get:
e∗i = β +
pk
2
− pβ +
(p
2
− γ
)
Ei (ai)− p (1− γ)Ei (aj) + p
1
2
e∗i (11)
Taking expectations with respect to probability p in equation (11) we obtain:
e∗i = β +
k
4
−
β
2
+
(
1
4
− γ
)
Ei (ai)−
1
2
(1− γ)Ei (aj) +
1
4
e∗i
which gives:
e∗i =
1
3
(2β + k + (1− 4γ)Ei (ai)− 2 (1− γ)Ei (aj)) (12)
Combing equations (12) and (11) we obtain the formula for the equilibrium level of
effort of agent i who has beliefs Ei(ai) and Ei(aj):
e∗i =
2p (1− γ)− 3γ
3
Ei (ai)−
4p (1− γ)
3
Ei (aj) + β −
2βp
3
+
2kp
3
(13)
Using equation (9) and (13) we obtain the equilibrium level of standard:
s∗i =
2 (1− γ)
3
Ei (ai)−
4 (1− γ)
3
Ei (aj) +
2
3
(k − β) (14)
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In equilibrium agent i produces the following amount of output:
y∗i = ai +
2p (1− γ)− 3γ
3
Ei (ai)−
4p (1− γ)
3
Ei (aj) + β −
2βp
3
+
2kp
3
+ ε˜i (15)
and ex-ante expects to produce:
Ei (y
∗
i ) =
(2p+ 3) (1− γ)
3
Ei (ai)−
4p (1− γ)
3
Ei (aj) + β −
2βp
3
+
2kp
3
(16)
We use equations (13) - (16) to derive the main propositions in the paper.
2.2 Implications
2.2.1 Ex-ante effects
Our model predicts that feedback policy can influence both productivity and beliefs
even before any information is revealed to the agents. In particular, agents who expect
to receive information about their opponent’s output with different likelihoods, other
things being equal, will expect to rank differently and will produce different levels of
output.
Proposition 1 If the agent believes that his ability is relatively high (low) compared to
the ability of the competitor then he will produce more (less) output and expect better
(worse) relative performance when the likelihood of feedback increases.
Proof. Using equation (15) we get that
dy∗i
dp
= 2
3
((1− γ) (Ei (ai)− 2Ei (aj)) + k − β).
Since γ < 1,
dy∗
i
dp
> 0⇔ Ei (ai) > 2Ei (aj)−
k−β
1−γ
and
dy∗
i
dp
≤ 0⇔ Ei (ai) ≤ 2Ei (aj)−
k−β
1−γ
.
We measure relative performance using the difference in agents’ outputs, Eiy
∗
i −Eiy
∗
j ,
and say that agent expects better relative performance when this difference increases.
The probabilities with which the agents receive feedback are not correlated, and thus we
get:
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dp
=
dEi(y∗i )
dp
= 2
3
((1− γ) (Ei (ai)− 2Ei (aj)) + k − β)
Since γ < 1,
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dp
> 0 ⇔ Ei (ai) > 2Ei (aj)−
k−β
1−γ
and
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dp
≤ 0 ⇔
Ei (ai) ≤ 2Ei (aj)−
k−β
1−γ
.
This proposition implies that giving subjects opportunity to compare themselves to
others makes the sufficiently confident ones more productive and more optimistic about
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their relative position in the group, which is highly desirable from the principal’s point
of view.
2.2.2 Ex-post effects
Comparative statics allow us to predict how agents who initially do not know their
relative position in the group adjust effort and beliefs about future rank as they change
their perceptions of relative ability.4 Different patterns in behavior and beliefs will occur
after good and bad feedback, that is, after the subject learns that he ranked better or
worse than he expected.
Proposition 2 After receiving good (bad) feedback about own ability, i.e. after the agent
learns that he is better (less) skilled than he expected, the agent’s output will
• decrease (increase) if p < 3γ
2(1−γ)
(sufficient condition is that γ > 2
5
)
• increase (decrease) if p ≥ 3γ
2(1−γ)
.
Proof. From equation (15) we get
dy∗
i
dEi(ai)
= 2p(1−γ)−3γ
3
and
dy∗i
dEi(ai)
< 0⇔ p < 3γ
2(1−γ)
and
dy∗i
dEi(ai)
≥ 0⇔ p ≥ 3γ
2(1−γ)
Notice that since p ≤ 1, if γ > 2
5
then
dy∗i
dEi(ai)
< 0.
Proposition 3 If the agent learns that his competitor is better (less) skilled than he
expected, he will decrease (increase) his future output.
Proof. From equation (15) we get
dy∗i
dEi(aj)
= −4p(1−γ)
3
< 0.
From Propositions 2 and 3 we learn that an agent will change his future output when
the feedback he receives about his own and/or his opponent’s ability is not in accordance
with his current beliefs. For example, an agent who learned that he is higher in the
productivity hierarchy (his own ability is higher and the ability of his opponent is lower)
will increase his future output if p ≥ 3γ
2(1−γ)
. For p < 3γ
2(1−γ)
, the direction of change in
the output will depend on the strength of the effect of own ability relative to that of the
competitor’s ability.
The next proposition establishes formally how agent’s beliefs change after he receives
feedback about his relative position in the group.
4Note that we do not explicitly model belief updating in this setting, that is, how agents use new
information about their own or their competitors’ performance to update beliefs about own and others’
abilities.
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Proposition 4 When the agent’s beliefs about relative performance are revised upwards
(downwards), he expects better (worse) relative performance in the future.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, we measure relative performance using the difference in
agents’ outputs, Ei (y
∗
i )−Ei
(
y∗j
)
, and say that agent expects better relative performance
when this difference increases.
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dEi(ai)
=
dEi(y∗i )
dEi(ai)
−
dEi(y∗j )
dEi(ai)
Ei
(
y∗j
)
= 4
3
(1− γ)Ei (aj)−
2
3
(1− γ)Ei (ai) +
2β+k
3
⇒
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dEi(ai)
= (2p+3)(1−γ)
3
−
2(1−γ)
3
= (2p+1)(1−γ)
3
> 0
d(Ei(y∗i )−Ei(y∗j ))
dEi(a∗j )
= −4p(1−γ)
3
−
4(1−γ)
3
= −4(1−γ)(1+p)
3
< 0
According to the model feedback also affects agents’ motivation. An agent who got
good feedback will become more ambitious in the future, in the sense that he will set
more demanding goals for himself. He will have to rank better in the future (produce
more relatively to his opponent) in order to maintain the same satisfaction level.
Proposition 5 When the agent’s beliefs about relative ability are revised upwards (down-
wards), he will choose a higher (lower) standard.
Proof. Using equation (14) we obtain
ds∗
i
dEi(ai)
= 2(1−γ)
3
> 0 and
ds∗
i
dEi(aj)
= −4(1−γ)
3
< 0
2.3 Total output - some implications
The previous propositions indicate that feedback about relative rank has ex-ante and ex-
post effects on beliefs and productivity in setting where agents still learn where they stand
in the rank hierarchy. It is therefore natural to ask what would be the effect of feedback in
well-established teams, that is, in settings where workers’ abilities and feedback policies
are common knowledge. The following subsection addresses this question.
2.3.1 Common knowledge of abilities and feedback probability
Recall equation (8)
e∗i = β − γEi (ai) + p
(
k − Ei
(
y∗j
))
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and assume that there is common knowledge of abilities and feedback probability. We
then get that in equilibrium
e∗i =
β (1− p) + pk (1− q) + pγaj + pqai − paj − γai
(1− pq)
(17)
y∗i =
β (1− p) + pk (1− q) + (1− γ) (ai − paj)
(1− pq)
+ ε˜i (18)
Therefore, the principal who hires a pair of workers (i, j) and provides worker i with
feedback with probability p and worker j with probability q expects the following level
of total output
Y ∗(i, j) = y∗i+y
∗
j =
β (2− p− q) + qk (1− p) + pk (1− q)
1− pq
+
(1− γ)
(1− pq)
(ai (1− q) + aj (1− p))
(19)
Proposition 6 For a given q, if agent i is good enough relative to agent j (that is,
if ai ≥
1
q
(
aj −
(k−β)(1−q)
(1−γ)
)
) it is optimal for the principal to increase the intensity of
feedback for worker i.
Proof. dY
∗
dp
= (1−q)
(1−pq)2
((k − β) (1− q) + (1− γ) (aiq − aj))
dY ∗
dp
≥ 0⇔ ai ≥
1
q
(
aj −
(k−β)(1−q)
(1−γ)
)
This proposition implies that a principal can extract more output from agents if he
provides more frequent feedback to high ability workers. Feedback about relative rank
is a cheap way to motivate the high types to work harder, since they enjoy learning
that they did better than the competition. While our experimental analysis precludes us
from having common knowledge of abilities and feedback probabilities, we can not test
this proposition directly. However, it suggests that feedback can be optimally provided
to agents of different types, to maximize effort provision when monetary incentives are
weak or non-existent.
3 Experimental design
The ideal dataset for understanding the role of private feedback regarding relative rank on
productivity would allow us to compare workers’ output when such feedback is provided
and when it is not provided, all other things being equal. It would also describe the
workers’ personal characteristics and rank expectations. It is hard, if not impossible, to
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obtain such data from the field and therefore we use a controlled experimental setting to
test our theory.
In the experiment we ask subjects to solve simple multiplication problems (multiply
one-digit numbers by two-digit numbers) during several identically structured rounds.
Therefore, participants make real effort choices. We use this task for several reasons.
First, no previous task knowledge is required and it is easy to explain. Second, task
learning effects, which we would like to avoid, should be minimal. In other words, we
expect that participants know how to solve multiplication problems before they come to
the lab, and their ability to solve these problems does not improve during the duration
of the task. Moreover, the score on this task depends on the subjects’ ability as well
as on their effort choice. Therefore, different subjects will end up with different scores,
which will lead to dispersed rankings. Also, the subjects’ ranks depend not only on
their own (possibly unknown to them) abilities but also on the unknown skills and effort
decisions of other participants. As a result, we are likely to find situations where the
subjects’ expectations are not confirmed by the received feedback. This allows us to
study how this mismatch between expectations and reality affects future expectations
and productivity. We are also able to assess whether this response differs when feedback
is positive (i.e., the subject learns that he did better than expected) and negative (i.e.,
the subject learns that he did worse than expected).
In order for our data to be meaningful, it is necessary to control for the difficulty level
of the multiplication problems. If randomly generated numbers were used to generate
multiplication problems, and a participant solved more problems in round two than in
round three this could mean two things. Either the person’s effort remained the same
across the rounds but the problems in period two were easier, or he worked harder in
round two while the problems were equally difficult in both rounds. We generated 206
multiplication problems of the same difficulty level, as in Cromer (1974)5 in order to
avoid this possible confound.
Problems were presented to each subject on a computer screen. Each time the subject
solved the multiplication correctly one point was added to his score and the next problem
was presented. If the subject provided a wrong answer, the score remained unchanged
and he was asked to solve the same problem again until answered correctly. By not
allowing subjects to move on to the next question unless the previous one was solved, we
avoid a situation where participants may strategically skip difficult problems looking for
5Examples of problems used are: 89 ∗ 4, 76 ∗ 9, 73 ∗ 8.
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easy ones.
The experiment consisted of 18 rounds. Each of them had the same structure and
three feedback conditions were possible. The conditions differed with respect to the
probability with which the subject received feedback about his relative rank at the end
of the round. This probability was either 0, 0.5 or 1. We refer to these as the ”No”,
”Maybe” or ”Sure” treatments, respectively. The feedback condition was determined
randomly and independently for every subject at the beginning of each round.6 Therefore,
in the same round different subjects faced different feedback conditions.
The sequence of events in each round is shown in Figure 1. First, subjects were
informed which feedback condition they were in. This information was consistent with
what happened at the end of the period and subjects were aware of that. We informed
subjects about the feedback condition in the beginning of each round because it allows
us to study the ex-ante effect of feedback probability on rank, expected rank, output and
effort choices.
Afterwards, subjects were asked to report their expected rank in that round.7 Follow-
ing that, subjects had 90 seconds to work on multiplication problems. For each subject,
their score was displayed on the screen throughout the round and was updated after
every correct answer (the score was reset to zero at the beginning of every round). After
the 90 seconds passed, subjects were asked to asses how much effort they had put into
the task that round. Answers were provided using a six point scale ranging from ”no
effort at all” to ”a lot of effort”.
In the final stage of each round, that lasted for fifteen seconds, each subject either
saw the performance ranking or not, depending on the feedback condition they had been
assigned to for that round. The ranking was determined by the current period scores of
all subjects in the group. The subject that solved the highest number of problems would
rank as number one, the one whose score was lower than scores of two other subjects
would rank as number three, etc. Each subject could see the scores and ranks of all the
participants but he could identify only his rank and score. Therefore each subject knew
6Using alternating messages within one session allows us to control for session effects.
7We did not pay subjects if their rank expectations turned out to be correct at the end of the round,
because doing so would have distorted behavior: all subjects would have declared that they rank last,
solved zero problems, and achieved the last rank indeed. We understand the importance of incentive
compatibility, and in other tasks where final compensation depends on output – and is not a flat wage
like in the current experiment – paying people if they made the correct rank guess would certainly be
desirable. However, as explained earlier, to understand how ego utility (i.e. liking to believe that we
rank higher that others) changes behavior we are confined to a flat-wage environment.
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that nobody else could associate his identity to his actual rank and score.
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)).
Subjects were given a written copy of the instructions (see Appendix) which they were
asked to read before the experiment started. The task was also described verbally by the
experimenter. Subjects practiced the task for one period, but feedback was not provided
during that time. No external aids (calculators, scratch paper, etc.) were allowed.
Subjects were recruited from Northwestern University using standard procedures. We
conducted eight sessions, but one of them had to be excluded due to technical problems.
We therefore present data from the remaining 54 subjects (24 male and 30 female), in
seven sessions. Each of these subject groups consisted of six to nine people. Importantly,
subjects received a fixed fee of $23 for their participation, independent of performance.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Ex-ante effects of feedback
As predicted by Proposition 1, ex-ante information about the likelihood of receiving
feedback at the end of the period about one’s rank has a significant impact on both the
subjects’ expected rank, as well as on their actual output, measured as the number of
multiplication problems solved correctly. These effects are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Output is 7.28% higher (11.35 vs. 10.58 solved problems per round, p < 0.07 in a
one-sided mean comparison test), and the expected rank is better (4.16 vs 4.90, p < 0.001
in a one-sided mean comparison test) for participants who are in the “Maybe” feedback
condition, than for those in the “No” feedback condition. There is no significant difference
between the output or expected rank of subjects in the “Maybe” feedback condition versus
“Sure” feedback condition.
Fig. 3 reveals significant gender effects on output and rank expectations, in each of
the three feedback likelihood conditions. Men solve significantly more problems than
women. Across all treatments, the average number of problems solved is 12.91 for men,
and 8.69 for women (p < 0.001 in a one-sided mean comparison test), in line with
the prior literature on gender and competitiveness (e.g. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini
(2003)). Also, men expect to rank better than women do (i.e. men report lower values for
ExpectedRankt). Across all conditions, men expect to receive a rank of 3.53, while women
expect to receive a rank of 5.53. The difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001 in a
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one-sided mean-comparison test). This is consistent with prior experimental findings. For
instance, Huberman, Loch, and Onculer (2004) observe that males seek status more than
women, and Falk and Knell (2004) find that women have significantly lower aspiration
levels than men regarding college education accomplishments.
The subjects’ rank expectation and their actual rank are positively correlated, and this
relationship becomes stronger in later periods. The Spearman rank correlation between
ExpectedRankt and Rankt is 0.58 in the first six periods, 0.82 in periods seven through
twelve, and 0.84 in periods thirteen through eighteen (p < 0.0001 in all cases). Therefore,
as the task progresses, people get better at guessing their actual rank in the hierarchy.
4.2 Ex-post effects of feedback
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 imply that the feedback received regarding one’s relative standing
in the group has effects on the expectations of future rank and on the actual output
produced in future rounds. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.
At the end of each round, subjects can receive one of three types of feedback re-
garding their relative ranking, depending on the relationship between their actual rank
and the rank they expected to get. If Rankt > ExpectedRankt, feedback is negative,
since subjects did worse than they expected. If Rankt < ExpectedRankt, feedback is
positive, and if Rankt = ExpectedRankt, it is neutral. We use three indicator variables,
BadFeedbackt, GoodFeedbackt and NeutralFeedbackt to capture these three types of
events.
The regression models in Tables 1 and 2 show the role of received feedback on future
output, expectations of rank, and actual rank. Doing better than expected in round t−1
(i.e. GoodFeedbackt−1=1) leads the subjects to expect a better rank in round t. Doing
worse than expected (i.e. BadFeedbackt−1 = 1) has the opposite effect, leading subjects
to declare a worse expected rank (i.e. a higher value for ExpectedRankt). Both of these
effects are measured relative to receiving neutral feedback in Table 1, and relative to not
getting any feedback at all in Table 2.
As predicted by Propositions 2, 3 and 4, while ranking information seems to make well-
performing subjects think they will rank even better in the future, and badly-performing
subjects think they will rank worse, the opposite actually happens. After receiving
negative feedback, people solve more problems, and achieve a better rank. After receiving
positive feedback, output is lower and the actual rank worsens. As above, these effects
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are measured relative to receiving neutral feedback in Table 1, and relative to not getting
any feedback at all in Table 2. We control for the prior values of expected rank, output
and actual rank to account for the mechanical effect that people who are top ranked can
only move higher in the rankings, whereas people who are already at the bottom of the
hierarchy can not rank any lower.
The likelihood of receiving feedback in the current round and the gender of the subject
have similar effects on output and expected rank as shown earlier in the univariate
analysis, and illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. If feedback is likely to be received – that is,
the probability of seeing the ranking at the end of the period is not zero, as captured by
the indicator variable FeedbackLikelyt – then subjects expect and achieve better ranks,
and the output is larger (however, the last effect is no longer statistically significant).
Males expect better ranks than females, and solve more problems.
We also find evidence suggesting that the ex-ante dispersion in expected ability
influences the agents’ beliefs about relative rank, and their actual output, in the direction
predicted by the model. Propositions 3 and 4 imply that the better agent i believes
competitor j is, the worse is the rank expected by i, and the lower is the output produced
by i. In our experiment, the number of men in the group is an exogenous manipulation of
the beliefs of women participants regarding their relative ability. We base this argument
on the results in Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) and Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) who show that women are less effective than men in competitive environments,
and this effect is stronger in settings where women compete against men than in single-
sex competitive environments. Hence, we proxy heterogeneity in the agents’ expected
ability by the gender composition of our subject groups. As shown by the results in Table
3, we find that the number of men in the group matters for the productivity of women,
but not for that of men. Women’s expected and actual ranks are worse, and their output
is lower, the more men there are in the group, as predicted by Propositions 3 and 4.
4.3 Hierarchies and the fight for dominance
The experimental evidence so far indicates that feedback about rank can impact the
dynamics of rankings. But these effects should be less important once the perfor-
mance hierarchy is established. Indeed, as shown in Table 4, when we estimate the
same regression models as in Table 1 for rounds 1-9 and 10-18 separately, we find that
GoodFeedbackt−1 and BadFeedbackt−1 influence strongly the subjects’ rank expectations
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in the early rounds, but these effects are no longer statistically significant during later
rounds. In other words, feedback about relative performance in a particular round does
not influence a subject’s expectations about where he will stand in the hierarchy in the
future, once the hierarchy is determined.
In light of this suggestive evidence, we test more formally whether stable hierarchies
do get formed, and if so, how soon it happens. Fig. 4 shows evidence that hierarchies
indeed emerge, and that effort is sustained even after the social dominance order is
established. First, the data indicate that output grows over time. This could in part be
due to learning effects (i.e. participants find better ways to do multiplications), and in
part due to a competition or ratcheting effect that is caused by people’s desire not to
lose their status in the hierarchy. We revisit these two effects at the end of this section.
Moreover, we find that the standard deviation of output increases over time, con-
sistent with subjects expending the appropriate effort levels needed to maintain their
rank (i.e. high effort for top-ranked individuals, and low effort for bottom-ranked ones).
The standard deviation of expected rank also increases in later rounds, suggesting that
people’s expectations “fan out” as they learn about their relative performance. Early
on, subjects have similar priors about their relative ability, but as they get feedback
regarding their output level, posterior beliefs about rank became more heterogeneous, in
accordance with the group’s diversity in abilities.
Another way to illustrate that hierarchies form early on and remain relatively stable
is to see whether people who were at the bottom of the ranking in the early rounds of
the task tend to stay at the bottom in later rounds, while people who started by being
at the top of the ranking will stay at the top. For each participant we calculated their
average rank in the first six, middle six and last six rounds of the task. We will refer to
these as the early, middle and late stages of the task. For each of theses three stages, we
assigned subjects to one of three rank performance bins: low, middle and high, depending
on their average rank during the six rounds that comprised the stage. Thus, subjects
in the low rank performance bin in a particular stage are those in the bottom third of
the performance distribution, as determined by how their average rank compared to the
average rank of the others in their peer group. Subjects in the high rank performance bin
are those in the top third of the performance distribution as measured by their average
rank during that stage.
Figures 5 and 6 show how people transition across rank performance bins as the
task progresses. Fourteen of the seventeen (82%) of the individuals who were in the
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bottom third of the rank hierarchy during rounds 1 through 6 end up in the same low
rank performance bin during rounds 7 through 12, and also during rounds 13-18. Of
the twenty-one subjects who were in the top third of the rank hierarchy during the first
six rounds, eighteen (86%) are still top performers during rounds 7 through 12, and
fifteen (71%) remain at the top during rounds 13-18. Thus, while there are instances
where subjects move up and down the hierarchy, most people stay in the same rank
performance bin they had in the first six rounds of the task. This indicates that by the
end of the first six rounds the hierarchy is already established.
While people’s ranks do not change much once the hierarchy is formed, the average
output of the group increases, as shown in Figure 4. Does this increase come from top
performers working harder to maintain their top rank, or by people in the middle or
low end of the hierarchy who want to get better rankings? The answer to this question
is relevant for optimal team formation and dynamics. If the increase in output comes
from people at the top of the ranking fighting for dominance, and not from people at
the bottom trying to get a better rank, then it may be efficient to reshuﬄe peer groups
by assigning bottom performers to new teams. There, they have a chance to be higher
up in the ranking, and will expend effort to preserve their newly-acquired position, thus
increasing the total output produced.
Figure 7 shows that the ratcheting effect observed in average output comes mainly
from subjects who were at the top or in the middle of the hierarchy in the first six rounds.
Individuals who ranked in the bottom third of the hierarchy early on have a slower rate
of productivity increase relative to the other participants. Therefore, the increase in
productivity that is shown in Figure 4 comes mainly from high productivity subjects
who fight to maintain or improve their rank. A recent quote8 by Vijay Singh, who was
the number one player in the Official World Golf Rankings in 2004 and 2005, illustrates
this ratcheting effect: ”I’m playing pretty good now, but my ranking doesn’t say that.
I’m number two.”
An alternative interpretation of the increase in output over time seen in Figure 7 is
that people simply get better at solving multiplication problems as the task progresses,
and those that had better performance earlier on learn faster. This interpretation is
unrelated to ego utility or to the ratcheting effect (that is, strategically choosing to work
harder in order to obtain a good rank). To investigate this alternative explanation, we
obtain a measure of how difficult it is for subjects to solve multiplication problems. We
8http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/v/vijaysingh183223.html
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calculate the cost of effort (CostOfEffortt) per multiplication problem as the ratio of
declared effort to output produced by each subject in each round. We average this quan-
tity across the three performance categories (early top, middle and bottom performers).
For learning to explain the patterns in Figure 7, it should be the case that the rate of
change in output and the rate of change in the cost of effort over time are negatively
related. In other words, early top performers will increase their output at a faster pace
relative to bottom performers because their cost of effort decreases at a faster pace over
time. As the data in Table 5 show, we do not find this to be the case.
The output of early top performers increases at twice the rate over time as that of early
bottom performers (∆Output
∆Round
is 0.21 and 0.11 for these two categories, respectively). The
cost of effort, however, decreases faster over time for bottom performers (∆CostOfEffort
∆Round
is
-0.01 for bottom performers and -0.004 for top performers).9 Therefore, learning effects
(i.e. the task getting easier over time) can not be the sole explanation for the increase in
output of those ranking well early on, since the task seems to get easier faster for early
bottom performers. Hence, ego utility – as shown by our model and previous empirical
results – can be a driver of output and lead to ratcheting at the top of the hierarchy, a
pattern illustrated by the data in Figure 7 and Table 5. Throughout the task, early top
performers declare higher effort levels relative to early bottom performers (4.40 versus
4.02, on a scale from 1 to 6), produce higher output (14.90 versus 6.65 multiplication
problems per round) and have a lower cost of effort (0.30 versus 0.61). All of these
differences are statistically significant (p < 0.01).
5 Conclusion
We propose that individuals’ utility is influenced by private information regarding their
relative performance. This hypothesis implies that feedback about rank has effects on
both productivity and on the dynamics of the rank hierarchy in groups of workers doing
similar tasks. These predictions are supported by experimental evidence. To separate
our theory from alternative explanations as to why rank information changes behavior,
we employ an experimental setting where subjects receive a flat wage for working on a
simple multiplication problem solving task, and where there can not exist reputation,
9The average rate of change in output, and in the cost of effort over time are estimated by regress-
ing Outputt and CostOfEffortt on Roundt, for participants in each of the three early performance
categories.
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strategy-learning or peer monitoring effects.
We find that agents increase output, and expect to rank better, if they think feedback
is likely. After receiving feedback, those who got better ranks than expected will decrease
output, but expect even better ranks in the future, while the opposite is true of people
who ranked lower than expected. The productivity hierarchy is established early on in
the task, and there is a ratcheting effect of rankings on output. People at the top of the
hierarchy early on work harder over time to maintain that position, while people at the
bottom do not change their productivity level as much.
Therefore, our results suggest that in competitive settings productivity and beliefs
are influenced by privately observed information about relative position in the group
hierarchy. Importantly, the effects of private rank feedback on output are comparable
to those of peer monitoring mechanisms documented in prior work. Mas and Moretti
(2007) find that a 10% increase in average co-worker productivity is associated with 1.7%
increase in a worker’s effort. By optimally arranging the mix of workers in each shift,
the firm in their sample could improve productivity by 0.2%. Similarly, Falk and Ichino
(2006) find that a 10% increase in a peer’s output results in a 1.4% increase in a given
individual’s effort. We find that giving people an opportunity to compare themselves to
others (by increasing the probability of feedback from 0 to 0.5) raises individual output
on average by 7.28%, a sizeable effect compared to that of peer monitoring.
In light of our findings, it is natural to ask whether an optimal feedback policy exists.
In other words, we would like to know whether organizations can increase their total
output through optimal feedback provision, perhaps by changing the timing and content
of information released to workers or by revealing information to certain individuals only.
Even though the current experimental setup does not allow us to directly compare such
complex feedback policies, our results have several implications for improving productiv-
ity. Those implications should be taken with caution, as their external validity remains
to be examined in future work.
For instance, the principal could take advantage of the ex-ante effect of feedback
likelihood on effort provision. Our model suggests that an organization could produce
more if it used different feedback likelihood policies for agents of different skill. Feedback
should be given more frequently to agents who either believe that they have, or actually
posses, relatively high ability. To prolong the effectiveness of relative rank information,
the principal could either provide noisy feedback to slow down the learning of one’s rank
in the hierarchy, or reshuﬄe work groups once the hierarchy is established and known.
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Since in more homogeneous groups incentives are preserved for all members while in
heterogeneous groups members split into top performers, who keep fighting for high
ranks, and bottom performers, who compete much less, reshuﬄing may allow low-rank
workers to climb the hierarchy in another group, and as a result, to generate more output.
Finally, the principal could manipulate the beliefs of the agents. Both the model and
the data suggest that if competitors appear to be too tough, an agent’s performance
deteriorates. Therefore, improving workers’ beliefs about their relative ability may have
a positive impact on productivity.
22
References
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentince-Hall.
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2002). Self confidence and personal motivation. Quarterly
Journal of Economics .
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole (2003). Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 70, 489–520.
Clark, A., D. Masclet, and M.-C. Villeval (2006). Effort and comparison income :
Survey and experimental evidence. Working Paper .
Clark, A. E. and A. J. Oswald (1996). Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of
Public Economics 61 (3), 359–381.
Cowen, T. and A. Glazer (2007). Esteem and ignorance. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization 63, 373–383.
Cromer, F. E. (1974, May). Structural models for predicting the difficulty of multipli-
cation problems. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education 5 (3), 155–166.
Deci, E. (1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York, Plenum Press.
Deci, E., R. Koestner, and R. Ryan (1999, November). A meta-analytic review of
experiments examining the role of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal
of Applied Psychology .
Easterlin, R. A. (1995, June). Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of
all? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 27 (1), 35–47.
Eriksson, T., A. Poulsen, and M. C. Villeval (2008, April). Feedback and incentives:
experimental evidence. Working Paper .
Falk, A., D. Huffman, and U. Sunde (2006, December). Self-confidence and search.
IZA Discussion Paper .
Falk, A. and A. Ichino (2006). Clean evidence on peer effects. Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics 24, 39–57.
Falk, A. and M. Knell (2004). Choosing the joneses: Endogenous goals and reference
standards. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106 (3), 417–435.
23
Fischbacher, U. (2007). Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments.
Experimental Economcs 10 (2), 171–178.
Frank, R. H. (1984). Interdependent preferences and the competitive wage structure.
RAND Journal of Economics 15, 510–520.
Frank, R. H. (1985). Choosing the right pond: Human behavior and the quest for status.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Frey, B. (1997). Not just for the money – An economic theory of personal motivation.
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
Frey, B. and R. Jegen (2001). Motivation crowding theory: A survey of empirical
evidence. Journal of Economic Surveys .
Gneezy, U., M. Niederle, and A. Rustichini (2003). Performance in competitive envi-
ronments: gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3), 1049–1074.
Gneezy, U. and A. Rustichini (2000, August). Pay enough or don’t pay at all. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (3), 791–810.
Huberman, B. A., C. H. Loch, and A. Onculer (2004). Status as a valued resource.
Social Psychology Quarterly , 103–114.
Kandel, E. and E. P. Lazear (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political
Economy 100 (4), 801–817.
Kluger, A. N. and A. DeNisi (1996). The effects of feedback interventions on perfor-
mance: A historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback interven-
tion theory. Psychological Bulletin 119, 254–284.
Knez, M. and D. Simester (2001). Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at
Continental Airlines. Journal of Labor Economics 19, 743–772.
Koszegi, B. (2006). Ego utility, overconfidence and task choice. Journal of the European
Economic Association.
Luttmer, E. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: relative earnings and well-being. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 120 (3), 963–1002.
Major, B., M. Testa, and W. H. Bylsma (1991). Responses to upward and downward
social comparisons: The impact of esteem-relevance and perceived control. in: Suls,
J. and Wills, T. A. (eds.), Social comparison: Contemporary theory and research,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 237–260.
24
Mas, A. and E. Moretti (2007). Peers at work. Working paper .
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review , 370–396.
McClelland, D., J. Atkinson, R. Clark, and E. Lowell (1953). The achievement motive.
Princeton: Van Nostrand.
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund (2007, August). Do women shy away from competition?
do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (3), 1067–1101.
Prendergast, C. (1999, March). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature 37, 7–62.
Seta, J. (1982). The impact of comparison processes on coactors’ task performance.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 42.
Szymanski, K. and S. G. Harkins (1987). Social loafing and self-evaluation with a social
standard. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 891–897.
Weinberg, B. (1999). A model of overconfidence.Working paper, Ohio State University .
White, P. H., M. M. Kjelgaard, and S. G. Harkins (1995, July). Testing the contri-
bution of self-evaluation to goal-setting effects. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 69, 69–79.
25
Appendix: Instructions
Welcome to our experiment on economic decision making!
The study will last about 60 minutes, during which you will participate in a 45-minute
experiment, and will fill out some questionnaires. Your task during the experiment is
to solve multiplication problems. Each time you provide a correct answer one point is
added to your score. Your score is refreshed in each period and you are going to play for
18 periods.
In each of the periods:
1) You will be told what information you will receive at the end of
the period regarding your rank in the group. Your rank is based on the number
of correct answers provided by you and the other participants. You will see one of
the following three statements on the screen, selected at random for each one of the
participants in each period:
“You WILL see the ranking this period.”
In this case, for sure you will see the rank information at the end of the period.
“You MAY see the ranking this period.”
In this case, there is an equal chance that you will or will not see the rank information
at the end of the period.
“You WILL NOT see the ranking this period.”
In this case, for sure you will not see the rank information at the end of the period.
2) You will be asked to estimate your rank in the group, before seeing
any of the multiplication problems.
Your rank is determined by your score in the current period. If you have the highest
score (i.e. nobody solved more multiplication problems than you did), you will rank as
number 1. If there is only one person who solved more problems you will rank as number
2, and so on.
Therefore, if you expect that x people will have higher score than yours, please type
in a number equal to x+ 1 as your expected rank and press the “Submit” button.
Example: You expect that 5 people will do better than you. Type in 6 and press
“Submit”.
3) You will be presented with multiplication problems to solve.
In each period you will have 90 seconds during which you can work on the multipli-
cation problems. To provide an answer, type it in the box and press “Submit”.
If your answer is correct a point will be added to your score and you will see another
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multiplication problem.
If your answer is incorrect, your score will remain unchanged and you will see the
message “Incorrect. Please try again”. You will be asked to solve the same problem
again. Only after you provide correct answer the program will move on to the next
multiplication problem.
4) You will be asked to report the level of effort you have put into doing
the task during that period.
Check the appropriate field that reflects how much effort you have put into doing the
task, ranging from “no effort at all” to “a lot of effort”, then press “Submit”.
5) You may see how you have ranked relative to others during the
period, depending on what you were told in the beginning of the period ( see
(1) )
If the ranking information is provided to you this round, you will have 15 seconds to
see it. The ranking is presented in such a way that every participant can identify only
his/her own score. In other words, your exact ranking for that period will be known to
you only. No other participant can see how you ranked that period.
Example: There are 10 participants. You solved 3 problems and five people did better
than you. The screen that you will see may look like this
This period is over!
Ranking in this period
Rank Name Score
1 . 10
1 . 10
3 . 9
4 . 8
5 You 3
5 . 3
5 . 3
5 . 3
9 . 1
9 . 1
In case you do not see the ranking you will be asked to wait for 15 seconds for the
experiment to continue.
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Then, the experiment moves on to the next period and all the stages are repeated.
In the end of the experiment we will ask you to fill in a short questionnaire.
Payment
You will receive a total of $23 in cash for your participation in our study.
Practice periods
You will have a chance to practice this task for one period. We encourage you to type
in at least one correct and one incorrect answer so that you know how to behave in both
cases. You will not see any ranking information in the practice period.
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Figure 1: Sequence of events in a round.
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Figure 2: Feedback likelihood, output and expected rank
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Figure 5: Transitions across ranks:
rounds 1-6 to rounds 7-12.
Figure 6: Transitions across ranks:
rounds 1-6 to rounds 13-18.
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Figure 7: The average output produced each round by subjects who were at the top, in
the middle or at the bottom of the rank hierarchy during the first six rounds.
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Table 1: The ex-post impact of feedback on estimated rank, actual rank and effort
Outputt is the number of multiplication problems solved correctly by the subject in round
t. ExpectedRankt is the rank that the subject expects to get in round t, as declared in the
beginning of the round. Rankt is the actual rank achieved by the subject in round t. Low
values for ExpectedRank and Rank indicate better rank expectations, and actual rank,
respectively (e.g. the top performing subject has Rank = 1). ExPostFeedbackt is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received relative ranking feedback at the end of
round t. GoodFeedbackt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received positive
feedback at the end of round t, i.e. when Rankt < ExpectedRankt. BadFeedbackt is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received negative feedback at the end of round
t, i.e. when Rankt > ExpectedRankt. FeedbackLikelyt is an indicator variable equal to
1 if the probability the subject will receive feedback on relative ranking is 0.5 or 1 (i.e.
if the subject is in the “Maybe” or “Sure” feedback treatment). Male is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the subject is male. Roundt is the round number. The reference
category is given by observations where subjects received neutral rank information at the
end of the prior round (NeutralFeedbackt−1 = 1). T-statistics are in parentheses.
Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
GoodFeedbackt−1 –0.76 –0.50 0.63
(–2.55)∗∗ (–4.56)∗∗∗ (3.54)∗∗∗
BadFeedbackt−1 0.74 0.54 –0.38
(2.19)∗∗ (4.17)∗∗∗ (–2.26)∗∗
ExPostFeedbackt−1 –0.12 0.23 –0.07
(–0.36) (1.49) (–0.44)
FeedbackLikelyt 0.56 –0.55 –0.31
(1.52) (–2.81)∗∗∗ (–1.79)∗
Outputt−1 0.75
(13.43)∗∗∗
ExpectedRankt−1 0.79
(13.52)∗∗∗
Rankt−1 0.66
(10.15)∗∗∗
Male 1.35 –0.39 –0.69
(3.33)∗∗∗ (–2.19)∗∗ (–2.63)∗∗
Roundt 0.05 –0.01 –0.00
(3.79)∗∗∗ (–1.49) (–0.20)
Adj. R2 0.664 0.701 0.540
No. of obs 918 918 918
Robust standard errors clustered by subject
Session fixed effects included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2: Ex-post impact of feedback on estimated rank, actual rank and effort
Alternative specification for models in Table 1. The reference feedback category is given
by observations where subjects did not receive relative rank information at the end of
the prior round (ExPostFeedbackt−1 = 0). T-statistics are in parentheses.
Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
GoodFeedbackt−1 –0.88 –0.27 0.56
(–3.08)∗∗∗ (–1.54) (3.50)∗∗∗
BadFeedbackt−1 0.62 0.77 –0.45
(2.26)∗∗ (5.17)∗∗∗ (–2.66)∗∗
NeutralFeedbackt−1 –0.12 0.23 –0.07
(–0.36) (1.49) (–0.44)
FeedbackLikelyt 0.56 –0.55 –0.31
(1.52) (–2.81)∗∗∗ (–1.79)∗
Outputt−1 0.75
(13.43)∗∗∗
ExpectedRankt−1 0.79
(13.52)∗∗∗
Rankt−1 0.66
(10.15)∗∗∗
Male 1.35 –0.39 –0.69
(3.33)∗∗∗ (–2.19)∗∗ (–2.63)∗∗
Roundt 0.05 –0.01 –0.00
(3.79)∗∗∗ (–1.49) (–0.20)
Adj. R2 0.664 0.701 0.540
No. of obs 918 918 918
Robust standard errors clustered by subject
Session fixed effects included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: Impact of heterogeneity in subjects’ competitive abilities on their estimated rank, actual rank and effort
Heterogeneity in the ability to compete is proxied by the gender mix in each subject group. The sample is split by the
subjects’ gender (Panel A: Women, Panel B: Men). MenInGroupt and GroupSizet are the number of male subjects,
and the total number of subjects in the group, respectively. Roundt is the round number. Outputt is the number of
multiplication problems solved correctly by the subject in round t. ExpectedRankt is the rank that the subject expects
to get in round t, as declared in the beginning of the round. Rankt is the actual rank achieved by the subject in round t.
Low values for ExpectedRank and Rank indicate better rank expectations, and actual rank, respectively (e.g. the top
performing subject has Rank = 1). T-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Women Only Panel B: Men Only
Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
MenInGroupt –1.10 0.37 0.60 0.25 –0.20 –0.10
(–2.59)∗∗ (1.69)* (2.68)∗∗ (0.32) (–0.50) (–0.25)
GroupSizet 0.42 0.29 0.19 –1.33 0.66 0.63
(0.97) (1.25) (0.86) (–1.13) (1.20) (1.18)
Roundt 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.22 –0.02 0.00
(4.57)∗∗∗ (0.72) (0.88) (5.53)∗∗∗ (–1.00) (0.17)
Constant 7.85 1.47 1.56 20.75 –0.92 –1.33
(2.97)∗∗∗ (1.06) (1.10) (2.46)∗∗ (–0.32) (–0.47)
Adj. R2 0.157 0.192 0.240 0.096 0.067 0.064
No. of obs 540 540 540 432 432 432
Robust standard errors clustered by subject
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: Diminishing effects of feedback over time
The table illustrates the ex-post impact of feedback on estimated rank, actual rank and effort, for rounds 1-9 (Panel
A) and 10-18 (Panel B). Outputt is the number of multiplication problems solved correctly by the subject in round t.
ExpectedRankt is the rank that the subject expects to get in round t, as declared in the beginning of the round. Rankt
is the actual rank achieved by the subject in round t. Low values for ExpectedRank and Rank indicate better rank
expectations, and actual rank, respectively (e.g. the top performing subject has Rank = 1). ExPostFeedbackt is an
indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received relative ranking feedback at the end of round t. GoodFeedbackt
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received positive feedback at the end of round t, i.e. when Rankt <
ExpectedRankt. BadFeedbackt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject received negative feedback at the end
of round t, i.e. when Rankt > ExpectedRankt. FeedbackLikelyt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the probability
the subject will receive feedback on relative ranking is 0.5 or 1 (i.e. if the subject is in the “Maybe” or “Sure” feedback
treatment). Male is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the subject is male. Roundt is the round number.
Panel A: Rounds 1-9 Panel B: Rounds 10-18
Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt Outputt ExpectedRankt Rankt
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
GoodFeedbackt−1 0.08 –0.73 0.25 –1.70 –0.22 1.03
(0.19) (–4.19)∗∗∗ (0.94) (–3.82)∗∗∗ (–1.12) (4.26)∗∗∗
BadFeedbackt−1 1.20 0.89 –0.48 0.40 0.24 –0.32
(2.71)∗∗∗ (4.98)∗∗∗ (–1.84)∗ (0.79) (1.23) (–1.36)
ExPostFeedbackt−1 –0.39 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.31 –0.18
(–1.08) (0.70) (0.24) (0.34) (1.39) (–0.76)
FeedbackLikelyt 0.41 –0.31 –0.26 0.75 –0.75 –0.37
(1.39) (–1.82)∗ (–1.52) (1.43) (–3.10)∗∗∗ (–1.61)
Outputt−1 0.81 0.70
(16.60)∗∗∗ (10.42)∗∗∗
ExpectedRankt−1 0.82 0.77
(16.74)∗∗∗ (10.64)∗∗∗
Rankt−1 0.69 0.63
(10.35)∗∗∗ (8.64)∗∗∗
Male 0.85 –0.35 –0.59 1.80 –0.42 –0.79
(2.20)∗∗ (–2.63)∗∗ (–2.07)∗∗ (3.73)∗∗∗ (–1.88)∗ (–2.91)∗∗∗
Roundt 0.08 –0.01 –0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00
(1.66) (–0.73) (–0.94) (1.78)∗ (0.04) (0.15)
Adj. R2 0.665 0.717 0.526 0.657 0.697 0.547
No. of obs 432 432 432 486 486 486
Robust standard errors clustered by subject
Session fixed effects included
∗p < .10,∗∗ p < .05,∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5: Ratcheting effect or learning?
Subjects are divided into three categories (top, middle and bottom performers) depending
on their rank in the hierarchy during the first six rounds of the task, as in Figure 7.
Effortt is an input provided by each subject at the end of each round, before the ranking
information is shown. Outputt is the number of multiplication problems solved correctly
by each subject in each round. Cost of effortt is calculated as
Effortt
Outputt
. The average rate
of change in output and in the cost of effort over time are captured by variables ∆Output
∆Round
and ∆CostOfEffort
∆Round
, respectively, and are estimated by regressing Outputt and Cost of
effortt on Roundt for subjects in each of the three early performance categories.
Ranking Average Average Average
in declared output cost of
rounds effort per effort ∆Output
∆Round
∆CostOfEffort
∆Round
1− 6 per round round per round
Top of hierarchy 4.40 14.90 0.30 0.21 -0.004
Middle of hierarchy 4.38 10.17 0.44 0.16 -0.01
Bottom of hierarchy 4.02 6.65 0.61 0.11 -0.01
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